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in aspects of everyday life that brought together the conditions for crime to take place: the co-presence of a likely offender, a suitable targets and absence of a capable guardian (Cohen and Felson, 1979) . The two theories have since been brought together and empirical research has tested amalgamated lifestyle/ routine activities theory across different settings at the micro-and/or macro-level, i.e., across individuals, households, areas, regions or entire countries (Gottfredson, 1981 ; see for instance, Miethe, Stafford and Long, 1987) . In short, empirical research to date has shown that prior crime experiences, young age, lone parenthood and adverse socio-economic backgrounds, such as social renting and multiple occupancy households, increase risk of criminal victimization. Lifestyle and routine activities effects however are conditional on demographic characteristics, while area of residence conditions individual risks, especially for property crimes (Tseloni, 2006; . In addition, the rank order of population subgroups in terms of vulnerability to victimization is crime-specific (Tseloni, Osborn, Trickett and Pease, 2002) .
Fortunately, only a minority of the general population are victims of crime in a single year, although some suffer a disproportionate number of incidents (Tseloni and Pease, 2005 ).
This chapter considers whether the sizeable crime drops of the last twenty years or so have altered crime inequalities, and, if so in what ways. Drawing on BCS data, the falls in domestic burglary, personal crime and vehicle theft in England and Wales from 1995 to 2009-10 are examined. The crime types have been selected because of their large contribution to overall crime rates. The crime drop in England and Wales was unexpected and unprecedented. It was, however, found also in many other countries . In contrast to other papers forming parts of the same program of work as this one (Farrell, Tseloni, Tilley and Mailley, 2011a; Farrell, Tseloni and Tilley, 2011b) , the present chapter is not concerned with the causes of those falls.
Rather, building on Tilley, Tseloni and Farrell (2011) , it examines whether any changes in crime inequality are associated with the falls. Three socio-economic attributes will be examined here: tenure, household income and household composition. As already indicated, these variables are among the most relevant to victimization risk, as suggested in theory and as corroborated in simple cross-tabulations. They are also found, in regression analyses, to operate independently of other factors. Thus, in this chapter our specific question is, 'To what extent, if at all, have the falls in domestic burglary, vehicle theft and personal crime victimization led either exacerbated or ameliorated levels of subgroup risk variation?'
The next section describes the data and the methodology used in this work and outlines the overall trends in domestic burglary, car crime and personal crime in England and Wales. The patterns of crime inequality across population subgroups with respect to household income, household composition, and tenure are discussed thereafter with respect to the end points of the overall period included in the analysis. Section 4 explores whether the crime drops are consistent across the population subgroups in question and the chapter concludes with a discussion of the results.
Data, Methodology and Context
The analysis in this section draws on eight sweeps of the BCS, from 1996 to 2009-10, The three crime categories examined in this chapter comprise domestic burglary, personal crime and vehicle theft. Personal crime includes violence against the person, robbery and theft from the person. Vehicle theft refers to theft of and from motor vehicles, but not damage to them or thefts relating to motorcycles. Collectively, these crime types made up 41.4 per cent and 33.9 per cent of all crimes included in the British Crime Survey in 1996 and 2009-10, respectively. Households are the units of analysis for domestic burglary, in which the target is fixed to the area of residence. In personal crime the individual is the unit of analysis. However, because the BCS sweeps drawn on in this chapter involved interviews only with those aged sixteen and over, it is likely that personal crimes will be under-estimated. In motor vehicle theft, the unit of the analysis is the car owning household. This study focuses on prevalence rates or risks (proportion of the relevant population experiencing one or more incidents of the given crime type) rather than incidence rates (number of incidents of the same crime type over the relevant population) As already mentioned, crime risk changes are examined in relation to three characteristics, household income, tenure and composition, which both theory and previous research have identified as important predictors of victimization. In this study, these population subgroups have been identified through common variables that can be created across BCS sweeps, although the indicators are not perfect. The income groups employed here, for instance, entail diminishing real value over time due to inflation. significant. This work is a preliminary step in examining crime inequality and the crime drop and as such it offers fresh insights into a much neglected aspect of crime trends to date. It is not, however, without caveats since, as the Discussion section points out, relying on cross-tabulations may confound the effects of individual socio-demographic characteristics. In addition, examining the end points of the (up-to-date) period of crime falls fails to identify any turning points in crime inequality trends. The next paragraph discusses the overall crime drops in England and Wales that make up the baseline against which crime inequality is investigated in the main parts of this chapter. Table 1 shows the variations in crime rate for domestic burglary, vehicle theft and personal crime by tenure, income and household composition in 1995, the first year in the trends examined in this paper. As we shall see, some differences in levels of victimization mirror other forms of inequality, whereas others do not do so.
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Patterns of inequality in levels of victimization
<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE>
Let us examine domestic burglary first. In 1995 just less than one in ten of those with a household income of £4,999 and under (9.8 per cent) experienced one or more burglaries (with or without entry). In all other income groups (£5,000-£5,999; £10,000-£19,999; £20,000-£29,000; £30,000 and over) between 6.1 per cent and 6.9 per cent suffered one or more burglary. If only burglary with entry is considered, as shown in Table 1 the same basic pattern is found: amongst those in the lowest income group 5.6 per cent were victims with the remainder falling between 3.5 per cent and 4.1 per cent.
With regards to household composition, single-parent families are at substantially higher risk of burglary than other types. Around one in six (17.6 per cent) were victims of at least one burglary (with or without entry) in the previous year, compared to between 6 per cent and 7.5 per cent for all other household types (2-3 adults with children; 1-2 adults with no children; 3 or more adults with no children). Likewise, if only burglary with entry is considered, 10.4 per cent of single-parent households experienced one or more incidents, compared to between 3.5 per cent and 3.9 per cent of the other household types.
Finally, with regard to tenure, Table 1 shows that only 3.5 per cent of owner occupiers experienced burglary with entry, compared to between 5.9 per cent and 6.2 per cent of those with other tenure types (social housing; private rental; other). For burglary (with or without entry), owner occupiers were again at lower risk (6.1 per cent) compared with other tenure types, amongst whom between 8.6 per cent and 10.2 per cent experienced burglary with or without entry. In the case of burglary, it appears that in 1995 substantially heightened risk of domestic burglary was associated with low income and with membership of a single parent household, whereas substantially reduced risk was associated with owner occupancy. The figures for burglary with and without entry, which are not shown in Table 1 for economy, are available from the first author.
We turn now to personal crime. In 1995 the risks amongst those in different groups varied from 8.9 per cent for those in households with incomes of £5,000 to £9,999 to 13.2 per cent for those in households with incomes of £30,000 or more. Those in households with incomes of less than £5,000 had a rate of 11.6 per cent. Those in bands between £5,000 and £30,000 and more had gradually increasing rates. In relation to household composition, members of single-parent households suffered personal crimes at a substantially higher rate than other groups, at 21.5 per cent. By contrast, 14.5 per cent, 12.3 per cent and just 9.4 per cent of individuals in households with three or more adults without children, 2-3 adults and children and three or more adults and no children experienced personal crime, respectively. With regards to tenure, adults in owneroccupied dwellings experienced the lowest personal crime risk, at 9.9 per cent, rising to 19.7 per cent for private renters. Roughly 13 per cent of adults in social rented or other accommodation experienced personal crime.
These findings suggest that the overall patterns for personal crime are less straightforward than those for domestic burglary. Although lone parenthood and owner occupancy conferred respectively higher and lower risks than those shown for other groups, household income presents a different pattern. Here risk increased along with income, whilst the poorest also had a relatively higher rate than those in middle income groups, showing a U-shaped distribution. Being quite poor but not amongst the very poorest was associated with relatively low risk. A possible explanation is that those in the £5,000 -£9,999 category may include relatively more pensioner households who have lower victimization risks than others. A complete socio-demographic profile of the lowest two income groups, and how they differ from the rest in the 1996 BCS, can be found in Tilley et al. (2011) , page 301.
Rates of theft of and from vehicles amongst car/van owning households varied by income in 1995, with the two upper (household annual income of £30,000 or more and £20,000 to £29,999) and the lowest (household income of £4,999 or less) income groups experiencing the highest risks, respectively at 20 per cent, 18 per cent and 17.6 per cent.
Households in the middle income groups were at lower risk of car theft (between 14 per cent and 15.3 per cent). The car theft inequality across household composition subgroups, mirrored that for personal theft: 23 per cent of single parent households were victimized, closely followed by 21.5 per cent of those with three or more adults without children. Only 13.9 per cent of car owners in households comprised of one to two adults without children suffered car theft, as did 18.5 per cent of those in households with two to three adults and children. As with burglary and personal crime, owner-occupiers experienced lower car theft prevalence rates (15.9 per cent) than those with other types of tenure. Private renters had the highest risk of car theft (21.3 per cent), as they also did for personal crime.
The above discussion clearly shows that single parents were consistently at considerably higher crime risk than others in 1995. It is equally evident that owner-occupiers were at lower crime risk than others across the board. Patterns relating to household income are, however, less consistent: car owning affluent households were at relatively high risk of vehicle theft and likewise their adult members had relatively high personal crime risks.
Affluent households, however, experienced relatively modest burglary risks compared to those in the lowest income category, which had the highest prevalence rate for this crime type. The poorest, however, did not experience an especially high rate of personal crime and this group's car owners experienced only a slightly higher rate than that for all households (17.6 per cent against an overall 16.7 per cent).
Crime inequality changes during the crime falls.
The distributions of crime risks across population subgroups in England and Wales described in the previous section agree with previous empirical research and victimization theory (Tseloni et al., 2002) . This section asks whether there have been alterations in these distributions over time, as crime levels have fallen. Table 2 repeats the information given earlier in Table 1 Table 3 shows that falls in vehicle theft are unrelated to tenure, but that income and household composition do make a difference. Poorer households experienced lower falls than those in higher income categories, exacerbating the initial car theft risk differentials.
Households comprising one to two adults without children began with relatively lower risks and then experienced a somewhat steeper decline than other household types.
Therefore, during the falls they became even better off than other groups in terms of car There are some differences between subgroups but no consistent pattern of convergence or divergence across crime types emerged from the analysis. There seemed to be corners of greater and lesser improvement in crime risk, which would warrant further interrogation. There are also some groups, notably single parents, poorest members of the community and private renters who continue to be at especially high risk compared to other groups and hence may warrant special crime prevention support. Each of these categories is heterogeneous and further work is needed to tease out more finely defined subgroups within the categories which are at greatest risk and why. Knowledge of this could inform the development of plausible, well-targeted preventive strategies.
The vulnerability differentials identified here may reflect levels of security, as well as the proximity, attractiveness and target availability to potential offenders (Cohen and Felson, 1979) . With regard to theft of and from cars, although the better off plausibly provide prospective offenders with more attractive targets, rates of theft may be lower due to the greater security of the vehicles themselves and the places they are parked as well the relative inaccessibility of the neighborhoods where the most affluent citizens tend to live.
The poorest may have less attractive cars and goods to steal from the vehicles, but their parking locations and inadequate car security may make them suitable targets for vehicle theft. With regard to burglary, the better off, especially owner occupiers, will tend to be less accessible (or less known about as targets) to likely offenders and may also have high levels of security that reduce risk, even though their houses will normally contain attractive goods to the prospective burglar. The risk of personal theft may be relatively high for the better off, both because they own more attractive goods and because they are out and about more often as prospective targets. By contrast, the very poorest may both be out less and have fewer attractive goods. This discussion is rather speculative, but highly plausible in the light of lifestyle/routine activities theory. It suggests a promising set of hypotheses for testing in future empirical research! Ignoring for a moment the issue of proximity to potential offenders, this analysis suggests that different households may face varying crime risks due to differences in security levels. This notion may most obviously be applied when considering differential availability of anti-burglary and anti-car theft devices across tenure or income population subgroups. But it may also be relevant in regard to varying levels of guardianship afforded by households with different types of composition.
The link between security and reduced risk of burglary is not straightforward, although past BCS-based research showed that households with more security have lower burglary rates in England and Wales (Mayhew, Aye-Maung and Mirrlees-Black, 1993) . The level of security cover is important: households with less-than-basic security experience six times more burglary than households with basic security (window locks plus double locks or deadbolts) and ten times more than those with enhanced security (Flatley et al., 2010: 2). But enhanced security does not confer any additional burglary with entry protection than basic security (Tseloni, 2011) . The level of protection against burglary is therefore not fully proportionate to the investment in more and better security devices (Tilley, Tseloni and Farrell, 2011 ). This conclusion is confirmed by the finding that the poorest households remained at the highest risk of burglary with entry. Their relative risk compared to more affluent households rose during the crime drops, despite the fact that households with less than £10,000 annual income enjoyed the highest increases in basic and enhanced security between 1995 and 2005-06 in England and Wales (Tilley et al., 2011) . In reality, poor and rich households also differ in other respects relevant to their crime risks. These differences include tenure and accommodation type and the tendency of rich and poor to inhabit different neighborhoods which are associated with different patterns of proximity to potential burglars, levels of informal guardianship and social capital (Sampson and Wooldredge, 1987) . The income differentials in burglary risk may therefore confound additional individual and area effects rather than being the simple consequence of more and better security. Security effects on burglary, in other words, are partly mediated or conditioned by household and area characteristics. This is brought out in a recent study which showed that enhanced home security in England and Wales is associated with area rather than household burglary (with entry) risks and that this relationship is mediated by household characteristics. Although in general households with a low level of security face increased burglary risks, some exhibit both high risk and high security levels (i.e., urban and inner city residents), while residents in some parts of the country enjoy low risks despite low security (Tseloni, 2011) .
Our results regarding home security and differential drops in burglary risks in England and Wales can be compared with findings from an analysis of ICVS data from twelve Western countries (Van Dijk, 2008) . This analysis has shown, first, that on average in Previous studies have concluded that improvements to vehicle security contributed substantially to the overall falls in car theft. They also suggested that the falls in vehicle theft may in turn have contributed to falls in other crime types, both because vehicle theft is a 'debut crime' that presages other types of criminal activity and because the availability of stolen cars is a useful resource enabling other crime, although the evidence for this so far is scant (Farrell et al., 2011a) . The current study's finding that the poorest households, which cannot afford new and more secure cars, had the highest vehicle theft risk in 2009-10, unlike 1995 , is also consistent with a role for built-in car security devices in producing the falls in vehicle crime. This chapter has been an early effort to examine volume crime inequality trends across a number of theoretically relevant socio-demographic characteristics, following Tilley et al. (2011) , which, however, confined its attention to income-related differentials in burglary falls. More research is needed better to understand the relative extent of crime falls across different population subgroups and the relationship between falls of different crime types overall and across distinct population clusters.
By making use of appropriate regression analyses of each crime type of interest over individual and household socio-demographic characteristics and routine activities at each end of the crime drop period to date (i.e., drawing on the 1996 and the 2009-10 BCS data), future research will be able to identify how the respective crime victimization odds (and risks) altered for specific individual and household types (Tseloni et al., 2002) . This research agenda has the advantage of estimating the contribution of each factor unconfounded with other characteristics, as in the case of the bivariate analyses presented here (Tseloni and Zarafonitou, 2008) . For instance a large number of lone parents live in social housing, such that the individual contributions of household type and tenure to their victimization relative risks and drops evidenced in this work will be confounded.
Furthermore, previous research has found that repeat victimization of some crime types has fallen significantly in England and Wales as well as internationally (Thorpe, 2007; Tseloni et al., 2010) . The falls in relative incidence (rather than prevalence) rates of various population subgroups, which has not been addressed to date, will be equally, if not more, informative about the crime falls and their policy implications.
The final chapter of this book discusses a full research agenda for improving our understanding of the crime falls. This is important for criminology as an academic discipline. It is also relevant to policy. It may provide clues on how best to cut crime further or to contain any emerging increases in crime, such as those which appeared at the time of writing, to be emerging for domestic burglary and personal theft in England and Wales (Chaplin, Flatley and Smith, 2011 The basis refers to car and van owning households. *Both these compare the 2009-10 rates with that for £30,000 and over in 1996 which was the highest household income category.
i The BCS employs the adult and household weights that adjust the sample size to represent the respective populations in England and Wales. This analysis however does not use the BCS weights because as it is concerned with trends and assuming that the mean household size has remained stable during this period their employment (or not) is not expected to affect the results.
